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Abstract
Ghana can be considered a relative success story in Africa.   We cite six variables—peace and stability, democracy 
and governance, control of corruption, macroeconomic management, poverty reduction, and signs of an 
emerging social contract—to suggest the country’s admirable political and economic progress.  The expected 
arrival of sizeable oil revenues beginning in 2011–13, however, threatens to undermine that progress.  In fact, 
numerous studies have linked natural resources to negative outcomes such as conflict, authoritarianism, high 
corruption, economic instability, increased poverty, and the destruction of the social contract.  The oil curse 
thus threatens the very outcomes that we consider signs of Ghana’s success.  This paper draws lessons from the 
experiences of Norway, Botswana, Alaska, Chad, and Nigeria to consider Ghana’s policy options.  One common 
characteristic of the successful models appears to be their ability to encourage an influential constituency with 
an interest in responsible resource management and the means to hold government accountable.  The Alaska 
model in particular, which was designed explicitly to manufacture citizen oversight and contain oil-induced 
patronage, seems relevant to Ghana’s current predicament. We propose a modified version of Alaska’s dividend 
program.  Direct cash distribution of oil revenues to citizens is a potentially powerful approach to protect and 
accelerate Ghana’s political and economic gains, and a way to strengthen the country’s social contract.  We 
show why Ghana is an ideal country to take advantage of this option, and why the timing is fortuitous.  We 
conclude by confronting some of the common objections to this approach and suggest that new technology 
such as biometric ID cards or private mobile phone networks could be utilized to implement the scheme.
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  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 
Total government oil revenue 
(US$ millions)13  752  723  1,324  1,326  1,352 
Potential payout per person           
Projected population 
(millions)14  24.8  25.3  25.9  26.4  26.9 
Payout / person (US$)15  30.29  28.53  51.21  50.26  50.21 
Per person payout (% of GDP 
/ capita)16  9.0%  8.2%  14.1%  13.3%  12.8% 
Potential payout per adult       
Adult population17  15.1  15.5  15.8  16.1  16.4 
Payout / adult (US$)18  49.65   46.78   83.94   82.39   82.32  
Per adult payout (% of GDP / 





























































































































































































E.  Basis for Carried Interest  C – D = 85,000 barrels a day
F.  Carried Interest  10% of E = 8,500 per day
G.  Development Cost  US $3 billion @ US $60 per barrel = 10,500 barrels 
a day 
H.  Basis for Additional Interest  E – F – G = 66,000 barrels per day
H.  Basis for Additional Interest  3.75% of H = 2,475 barrels per day
J.  Basis for Tax  H – I = 63,525 barrels per day
K.  Tax  35% of J = 22,234 barrels per day 
L.  Total State Share  B + F + I + K = 38,209 barrels per day
 
“From the above computation, oil accruing to the State would be calculated as 38,209 barrels 
per day out of 100,000 barrels per day production and this multiplied by an assumed long term 
price of US $60 a barrel amounts to US $2,292,540.00 per day which would translate to US 
$836,777,100.00 per annum.  
 
“A daily production of 200,000 barrels which could be achieved 5 years after commencement of 
production could give the State a total revenue of approximately US$1.6 billion per annum.” 
(Ghana National Petroleum Corporation 2008) 
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